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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Did Petitioner Wheeler Machinery Co. ("Wheeler") properly preserve the
statute of limitations issue on appeal? This issue is a question of law, which is reviewed
for correctness.
2. Was the Utah Court of Appeals correct in concluding that a negligence
claim arising out of the after-sale installation of a product does not fall within the Utah
Products Liability Act? This issue is a question of law, which is reviewed for
correctness.
3. Was the Utah Court of Appeals correct in concluding that Respondent
Wheeler Machinery Co.'s ("Wheeler") installation services occurred after the sale of its
product where the record showed that Wheeler had delivered the product components
over to the Respondent's insured ("the City") and that the City had been responsible for
part of the assembly and installation of the component parts? This is a question of law,
which is reviewed for correctness.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Nature of the Case
This case arises out of fire damage to a City power plant, which was caused by the
negligent installation of thimble rain caps that Wheeler purchased from DME in Santa Fe
Springs, California and had delivered to Hurricane City for installation above the exhaust
pipes of a generator set. Wheeler sold the component parts for the system to the City.
Wheeler also agreed to be responsible for a portion of the installation of that system—
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including the negligent installation of the thimble rain caps which was the cause of the
fire.
2. Course of Proceedings and Disposition
The City filed a complaint against Wheeler on July 10, 2003 in the Fifth District
Court of Utah for the County of Washington. Wheeler filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, which the district court denied. In its decision, the district court concluded that
the City's negligent installation claims were not subject to the products liability statute of
limitations. Following discovery, Wheeler filed a motion for summary judgment, which
the district court granted on the grounds that the contractor who caused the fire was
acting under the direction of the City. The City timely appealed the district court
judgment to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court,
concluding that the contractor who caused the fire was Wheeler's agent. The Court of
Appeals also concluded that the City's negligence claims were not barred by the products
liability statute of limitations. Utah Local Government Trust v. Wheeler Machinery Co.,
2006 UT App. 513. Wheeler then filed a Petition for Certiorari, which this Court granted
on April 27, 2007 on the issue of the statute of limitations.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Utah Local Government Trust is a trust presiding over various state-owned
properties within the state of Utah, including the Hurricane City power plant located at
526 West 600 North, Hurricane, Utah. (R. at 37.)
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2. In early 1999, the City issued a Request for Proposal ("RFP") for supplying
two generator sets to the City for the purpose of providing emergency and peak electrical
power to the City. (R. at 202,1) 3, 295, H3.)
3. Wheeler submitted a number of written bid proposals to the City, the first
and most comprehensive being dated February 24, 1999 ("Initial Bid"). (R. at 202, U4.)
4. As part of its Initial Bid, Wheeler agreed to supply two generator sets,
including the exhaust pipe and mufflers for the generators sets, and to supply two weather
enclosures into which the generator sets would be placed. (R. at 202, ^ 5.)
5. After Wheeler submitted its Initial Bid, the City made a number of changes
to the overall power generation project. One of the City's major changes to its power
generation project was to place the generator sets in a larger building which the City
would construct, rather than having them housed in the small weather enclosure
structures as originally called for in the Initial Bid. (R. at 202, ^ 6.)
6. As it turned out, the mufflers provided by Wheeler as part of the exhaust
system for the generators were too heavy to be installed on the roof of the building.
Wheeler participated in the discussions and planning for how to address the issue of the
heavy mufflers, which resulted in the installation of wooden 4x4 supports and a C
channel metal frame to be installed on the roof. (R. at 299,1 12; 13, H22.)
7. The exhaust system for the generator sets included an exhaust pipe that
connected to the generators and extended through the ceiling and roof of the building. A
thimble was placed in the ceiling/roof so that the exhaust pipe could pass through the
ceiling and roof without touching either directly. A component of the thimble is a rain
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cap, which serves to prevent moisture from entering the building at the point where the
exhaust passes through the thimble. (R. at 204, U14.)
8. Wheeler supplied the generator sets and the components for the exhaust
system, including the exhaust pipe, thimble, rain cap, mufflers and framework. (R. at
206,H18.)
9. The City agreed to perform a certain amount of installation work on the
components of the generator sets. (R. at 205-06.)
10. All exhaust system components supplied by Wheeler prior to August 1,
2000 were part of the generator sets accepted by the City and paid for by the City as a
single item. Id.
11. The City's employees installed the mufflers on the roof, installed thimbles
between the ceiling and roof of the building, put exhaust pipes through the thimbles,
created cradles for the muffler, and put in the wooden 4x4 supports, but did not install the
thimble rain caps. (R. at 262-63, 266-67, 281-82.)
12. Wheeler admits that it hired and paid Richard Carlson of Independent
Welding, an independent contractor, to fabricate the appropriate length of exhaust pipe to
be used for the generator sets, to fabricate and weld on the flanges to the top and the
bottom of the exhaust pipe in order to permit the exhaust pipe to attach at the outlet of the
Y manifold on the generator sets and to the mufflers on the other end of the exhaust pipe.
(R. at 205, H16, 208, H27; R. at 2, 1 1, 302-03, H 18.)
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13. During the course of attaching the rain caps to the exhaust piping above the
thimble, Carlson determined that the thimble rain caps did not fit into the framework that
he had created to fit Wheeler's muffler dimensions. (R. at 208, H28; R. at 308, H28.)
14. Wheeler directed Carlson though Don Johnson to "make it fit" and gave
oral consent to his work. To make the rain caps fit into the framework, Carlson had to
cut off about a half inch on opposite sides of each rain cap. (R. at 307-09, fl 27, 29.)
15. Wheeler verbally approved Carlson's work on the cradle to the muffler, the
thimble rain cap and setting the mufflers. (R. at 303-04, H19.)
16. Mr. Carlson testified that he submitted invoice 99-643 to Wheeler for
installing the exhaust piping through the roof and thimble, which included his work on
the rain cap. Mr. Carlson further testified that he did not submit invoices to the City for
anything to do with the exhaust system or specifically the rain cap. (R. at 380-83, 385-
86.)
17. Wheeler did not dispute any of the invoices submitted by Mr. Carlson. (R.
at 333-35.)
18. Wheeler admitted that none of its employees ever got up on the roof of the
building in question to inspect the work done by Carlson. (R. at 310.)
19. On August 3, 2000, one of the generators overheated and caused fire to the
surrounding roofing materials, resulting in extensive damage to the building premises and
equipment in an amount in excess of $500,000. (R. at 44, H10.)
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20. The modification of the rain cap allowed heated air to impinge on the 4x4
timbers, which caused the fire for which damages are sought in this case. (R. at 311,
1135.).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The sole issue before the Court is whether the Court of Appeals correctly
determined that the City's claim against Wheeler for negligent installation of thimble rain
caps was not subject to the products liability statute of limitations. Because Wheeler
failed to properly appeal this issue on appeal, this Court should sustain the Court of
Appeals' ruling on that basis alone. Regardless, the Court of Appeals was absolutely
correct in concluding that the City's negligent installation was not a products liability
claim because the installation occurred after the sale of the product to the City. Wheeler
had already sold and released the thimble rain caps and the other components of the
generator system to the City's control prior to installation of the system by the City and
Wheeler.
ARGUMENT
I. WHEELER FAILED TO APPEAL THE DISTRICT COURT'S AUGUST
13, 2003 RULING THAT THE PRODUCT LIABILITY STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS DID NOT APPLY.
Wheeler failed to appeal the issue of whether the City's negligent installation
claim was subject to the products liability statute of limitations. The district court fully
analyzed the statute of limitations issue in its ruling on Wheeler's motion to dismiss, filed
August 13, 2003. (R. at 22.) In that ruling, the court stated:
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The parties to this case agree that the generators themselves were not
defective. Rather the problem alleged by ULGT relates to the
installation of the generators into the building. While the generators
themselves were non-defective, the installation of the non-defective
generators may have been performed in a manner which would be
considered negligent, if the generators were installed too close to
wooden supports, resulting in the fire. If the installation of the
generators was done negligently and a dangerous condition resulted,
that did not make the generators a defective product. Regardless of
the fact that the installation was done by Defendant, who was also
the manufacturer of the product installed, the product itself was not
defective. Plaintiff has not alleged a strict products liability case,
and Plaintiff may proceed with its negligence claim.
(R. at 88) (emphasis added). That ruling was never appealed by Wheeler. It therefore
stands as the only definitive holding by the district court on the statute of limitations issue
in this case.
Had Wheeler wanted to appeal the district court's August 13, 2003 ruling on its
motion to dismiss, the proper mechanism for doing so would have been a cross-appeal.
Instead, Wheeler attempted to relitigate this issue—rather than following the proper legal
procedures of appealing the August 13, 2003 ruling of the Court—by raising the issue sua
sponte in its response to the City's appeal from the district court's grant of Wheeler's
motion for summary judgment, which was filed years later. It did so by
mischaracterizing the trial court's holding in the subsequent summary judgment ruling
dated May 3, 2005 (R. at 479), claiming that the statute of limitations issue "was fully
explored by the district court and was the primary basis for its dispositive ruling" on the
summary judgment motion. (Wheeler Ct. App. Br. at 12.) This is not an accurate
account of the district court's summary judgment ruling.
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In reality, the district court merely stated as follows:
To the extent that Plaintiffs claim that Defendant negligently
installed a modified DME thimble rain cap and an
oversized/overweight muffler" may constitute a product liability
claim, it was filed too late and is barred by the applicable statute of
limitations.
(R. at 481) (emphasis added). The district court never concluded in its summary ruling
that the City's negligence claim did in fact constitute a product liability claim. It simply
stated that if the negligence claim were merely a product liability claim based on a
product defect, it would be untimely. The fact that the district court never reached the
product liability issue in its summary ruling is further supported by the total absence of
any analysis or discussion of the issue whatsoever in the body of the summary ruling.
The sole reference to the products liability issue in the summary ruling is the language
quoted above.1
This Court may affirm the Court of Appeals' decision on any basis. Because
Wheeler failed to timely appeal the district court's August 13, 2003 ruling that the
product liability statute of limitations did not apply, this Court can and should affirm the
Court of Appeals' decision on that basis alone.
II. THE CITY'S CLAIM AGAINST WHEELER FOR NEGLIGENT
INSTALLATION IS NOT A PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIM.
Even if Wheeler had filed an appeal, which it did not, its contention that the City's
negligent installation claim is subject to the products liability statute of limitations is
without merit. It is critical to this case to understand that Wheeler filled two separate and
The basis for the district court's ruling was that Mr. Carlson was not shown to have
acted at Wheeler's direction. (R. at 481-82 | 3.)
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distinct roles in this transaction—that of product seller and that of installation service
provider. First, Wheeler supplied the components of the generator system to the City.
Then, after purchase and delivery, Wheeler hired a contractor to install part of the exhaust
system. Wheeler was only one of the parties involved in the installation of the generator
system—in fact, part of the installation was performed by individuals hired by the City.
It was merely a coincidence that the contractor who performed the faulty installation
work, was hired by Wheeler—which also happened to be the product supplier—rather
than the City. This coincidence is not a sufficient basis for converting the City's
negligent installation claim into a products liability claim.
This is particularly true in light of the fact that Wheeler did not supply a defective
product, and the City's claims against Wheeler do not arise out of a product defect.
Nowhere does the City allege that any of the components that Wheeler supplied for the
generator set was defective when delivered to the City or when installation of the system
began. In fact, had the DME rain caps purchased by Wheeler and delivered to the City
been properly installed, they too would have functioned correctly.
The DME thimble rain caps were not the cause of the fire. Rather, the fire was
caused by Wheeler's negligent installation of the nondefective DME rain caps into the
City's building. Because the roof of the building on which the City decided to place the
mufflers was not strong enough to bear the weight of the generators, Wheeler's agent,
Mr. Carlson, modified the rain caps at Wheeler's direction. This ill-considered
modification during the installation process caused the fire—not a defect in the products
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themselves. The City's claim is therefore simply a negligent installation claim and not a
products liability claim.
III. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AS TO THE
INAPPLICABILITY OF THE UTAH PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT IS
CORRECT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A. The Court of Appeals' Decision is Directly Supported by the Law in
Utah and Other Jurisdictions.
The Utah Product Liability Act provides as follows:
No product shall be considered to have a defect or to be in a
defective condition, unless at the time the product was sold by
the manufacturer or other initial seller, there was a defect or
defective condition in the product which made the product
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(1) (emphasis added). Therefore, only product defects existing
at the time of sale can give rise to a products liability claim. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals correctly concluded that "the after-sale negligent installation of a nondefective
product does not give rise to a product liability claim." Utah Local, 2006 UT App. at
H12.
The Court of Appeals' interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(1) as excluding
after-sale installation service from the scope of the Act was perfectly in-line with—and in
fact mandated by—this Court's prior decision in Alder v. Bayer Corp.. 2002 UT 115
H23, 61 P.3d 1068. The defendant in Alder both sold and installed an x-ray machine at
the plaintiffs premises. There was no allegation that the x-ray machine was defective
when sold. However, the defendant subsequently moved the x-ray machine into a
different room in plaintiffs building, where it negligently reinstalled the machine. This
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Court held that because the x-ray machine was not defective when sold, the defendant
could not be held liable under a products liability claim, regardless of the fact that the
defendant had acted as both seller and installer of the product.
In light of Supreme Court precedent in Alder, the Court of Appeals correctly noted
that defective installation of an otherwise nondefective product can only give rise to a
products liability claim if the installation occurred before the sale of the product. Utah
Local, 2006 UT App. at TJ 13. This before-sale/after-sale dichotomy makes perfect sense
because if the installation occurs before the sale of a product, then it must be an integral
and inseparable part of the product itself. Defective installation would, in that scenario,
render the delivered product defective. On the other hand, if installation occurs after the
sale of the product, then the act of installing the product could not logically be considered
an integral part of the product itself. The installation in that situation would merely be an
after-sale service which could be performed by any qualified person, not necessarily the
same person who delivered the product.
In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals, therefore, appropriately analyzed
whether Wheeler's installation work had occurred before or after the "sale" of the
component parts to the City. Specifically, the Court of Appeals focused on whether
Wheeler performed the assembly and installation "before the systems were put into the
stream of commerce, i.e., turned over to the City." Id, at U 14 (emphasis in original).
Noting that the installation did not occur until "at least some control over the component
parts had been relinquished to the City" and that "the City was to some extent involved in
the assembly and installation of the exhaust system," the court correctly concluded that
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"the installation of the nondefective exhaust system—whether rendered by the City or its
agent or by Wheeler or its agent—was an 'after-sale' service." Id. at 1ffl 14-15.
Accordingly, the City's negligent installation claims against Wheeler were not subject to
the products liability statute of limitations. Id.
B. Wheeler's Objections to the Court of Appeals' Decision are Not
Supported by Law.
Wheeler first complains that the Court of Appeals failed to define the term "sale",
and then curiously objects to the Court of Appeals' use of the phrases "'into the stream of
commerce,' having the goods 'turned over,' and relinquishing 'some control over the
component parts'" in its inquiry into whether the "sale" took place prior to installation.
(Wheeler App. Br. at 6-7.) The Court of Appeals' opinion makes clear these factors are
relevant in determining when a "sale" has occurred. Short of expressly announcing,
"Here is the definition of 'sale,'" the Court of Appeals could not have been more plain
and straightforward.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals' analysis in this regard is well rooted in the law
of products liability. As explained in one prominent treatise:
In order for an object to constitute a product, the Restatement
requires that it be sold, and the Model Uniform Product
Liability Act requires that it be produced for introduction into
trade or commerce. ... A product must be in some manner
released to the consuming public before it may be said to
have been introduced into the stream of commerce.
63 Am. Jur. 2d, Products Liability § 657 (emphasis added); accord Thomas v. St. Joseph
Hosp., 618S.W.2d791 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
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Courts in other jurisdictions have likewise used similar language and analyses in
determining whether installation of a product occurred before or after its "sale." In its
decision, the Court of Appeals specifically cited to the Oregon case of Jamison v.
Spencer R.V. Ctr.. Inc., 779 P.2d 1091 (Or. Ct. App. 1989). In Jamison, the plaintiff
purchased a trailer hitch, which the seller assembled and installed on the plaintiffs truck.
The assembly and installation allegedly included a weld within the hitch that
subsequently failed and resulted in an accident. Id. at 1092. As explained by the Court
of Appeals, the Oregon court concluded that the installation in this case was not merely
an after-sale service because "'the alleged negligence occurred before the hitch was put
into the stream of commerce'—i.e., the date the truck was picked up after the
installation." Utah Local 2006 UT App. at K 13.
Wheeler responds to the Court of Appeal's interpretation of Jamison by arguing
incorrectly that the Jamison court's discussion of the after-sale doctrine was mere dicta.
To the contrary, the Jamison court directly addressed the issue in response to the
plaintiffs argument that the negligent installation claim was not barred by the products
liability statute of limitation because installation occurred after the "sale" of the product.
Jamison, 779 P.2d at 1093. The court rejected this argument, stating that a product does
not enter "the stream of commerce" until it "leaves the seller's hands." Id If the court
had not rejected the plaintiffs argument regarding "after-sale service", the outcome of
the case would have been entirely different. This is not the definition of dicta.
Wheeler also wrongly contends that the Court of Appeals' decision focused
strictly on the location of the installation and required that "the defective work has to
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occur before the product leaves the seller's premises." (Wheeler App. Br. at 12.) This is
simply not true. The installation locale had nothing whatsoever to do with the Court of
Appeals' decision in this case. As in Jamison, the issue was simply whether the product
had been turned over or released in some fashion to the buyer. The fact that Wheeler had
delivered the system parts to the installation site was not the basis for the Court of
Appeals' conclusion that the installation work occurred after the sale. Rather, the Court
of Appeals was persuaded by the fact that "at least some control over the component
parts had been relinquished to the City" and that "the City was to some extent involved in
the assembly and installation of the exhaust system." Utah Local, 2006 UT App. at
Yi 14-15 (emphasis added). Instead, DME placed the thimble rain caps into the stream of
commerce when it sold the product to Wheeler.
Finally, Wheeler attempts to distinguish Jamison by arguing that the crux of the
decision was that the product had become defective through a modification, rather than
during installation. That assertion is not supported by the facts. In Jamison, "[t]he
parties stipulated that the weld that allegedly failed was made during defendant's
installation of the hitch," and the court expressly noted that it did not "distinguish defects
created in the assembly of the trailer hitch from those made in the installation." Jamison,
779 P.2d at 1092, 1093 n.l. In fact, the hitch was not modified at all but merely welded
together during installation. Id. at 1093. Regardless, the product at issue in the present
case was plainly modified during installation of the exhaust system by the contractor
hired by Wheeler to install exhaust system.
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C. The Facts in the Record Fully Support the Court of Appeals' Decision.
Contrary to Wheeler's assertion, there is ample support in the record for the Court
of Appeals' determination that "at least some control over the component parts had been
relinquished to the City" and that "the City was to some extent involved in the assembly
and installation of the exhaust system." Utah Local, 2006 UT App. at 1fl| 14-15. Most
notably, Wheeler has argued at every stage of the proceedings that it had no
responsibility whatsoever for installing the system and that the installation work was
performed entirely by the City and its agents. (See, e.g., R. at 205-209, Wheeler Ct. App.
Br. at 4.) Wheeler's Robert Spears declared in an affidavit that the City had agreed to
perform a certain amount of installation work on the components of the generator sets
and that no Wheeler employee was on the roof when the thimble and mufflers were
placed on the roof. (R. at 205-06.) He further stated that Wheeler was never asked "to
comment on or give an opinion on any drawings or plans as to how the generator sets'
exhaust system, including the4x4 wooden supports or the C channel metal framework for
the mufflers, would be designed or otherwise installed on the roof of the City's building."
(R. at 207.) He also asserted that "[a]ll exhaust system components supplied by Wheeler
prior to August 1, 2000 were part of the generator sets accepted by the City and paid for
by the City as a single item." Id.
Richard Carlson likewise testified that City employees installed the mufflers on
the roof, installed thimbles between the ceiling and roof of the building, put exhaust pipes
through the thimbles, created cradles for the muffler, and put in the wooden 4x4 supports.
(R. at 262-63, 266-67, 281-82.)
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Notwithstanding this testimony and evidence in the record, Wheeler falsely asserts
in its brief that the City has previously argued that the City had no role whatsoever in the
installation of the system and that the City must be bound by that assertion at this stage of
the proceedings. (Wheeler App. Br. at 9 n.4.) In fact, the City has never made such an
assertion. The evidence demonstrates the City's level of involvement in certain aspects
of construction and installation, just as it demonstrates Wheeler's direct involvement in
the negligent installation of the thimble rain caps. (R. at 205-06, 208, 262-63, 266-67,
281-82, 302-04, 307-09, 333-35.)
Moreover, the focus of the district court and the court of appeals in this case has
exclusively revolved around who hired Richard Carlson to install that portion of the
exhaust system that caused the fire. The question of who was responsible for installing
the other parts of the system was never raised below because it was not relevant to the
issue before the courts. It is true that the City has loudly and consistently protested that it
was Wheeler who hired and directed Mr. Carlson's work on the thimble rain caps at
issue, but the City has never asserted that it was not involved in other aspects of the
installation.
Wheeler, on the other hand, now seeks to switch positions regarding the extent of
its involvement in the installation. Wheeler prevailed in the district court by arguing that
it had no involvement whatsoever in the installation of the system, let alone specific
responsibility for Mr. Carlson's installation work. It likewise vociferously argued before
the Court of Appeals that it did nothing but sold the component parts to the City.
Wheeler now stands before this Court and argues unabashedly that it was not only
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responsible for Mr. Carlson's faulty installation work but also for the entire generator and
exhaust system, all in a misguided attempt to convince the Court that the installation of
the component parts it sold to the City was an integral, essential, and inseparable part of
those products. The truth falls between Wheeler's changing positions: Wheeler
contracted to undertake only certain aspects of the installation—including installation of
the thimble rain cap which caused the fire—while the City undertook certain other
aspects of the system installation entirely unrelated to the cause of the fire.
The City does not dispute that the components for the generator system constituted
a "single sale" or a "single product." However, this does not lead logically to the
conclusion that the installation of those components was part of that single product or that
the installation services were included in that single sale. Wheeler's Robert Spears
himself admitted in one breath that all of the system components were "accepted by the
City and paid for by the City as a single item," and in the next breath declared that
Wheeler had no involvement at all in the installation of the system. (R. at 206-08.) The
fact that the Caterpillar generator system from Utah could not safely function until the
DME thimble rain caps from a manufacturer in Santa Fe Springs, California were in
place does not mean that installation was necessarily included as part of the product
anymore than the fact that a tire which is useless until it has been safely installed on a
vehicle means that the installation of the tire is necessarily part of the product itself. See
Hoover v. Montgomery Ward & Co.. 528 P.2d 76 (Ore. 1974) (Supreme Court held that
the installation of a nondefective tire was an after-sale service not subject to the products
liability statute of limitations.) Indeed, until this stage in Wheeler's appeal, Wheeler has
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argued that it could simply sell component parts, and separately agree to install some or
all of the parts or not.
IV. THE ALTERNATIVE TESTS PROPOSED BY WHEELER ARE
IMPRACTICAL AND ILLOGICAL WHEN APPLIED TO CASE AT
HAND.
A. Usability Test.
Wheeler urges this Court to reject the after-sale test which it adopted in Alder—
and which the Utah Court of Appeals applied in this case—in favor of an entirely
different standard fashioned by Wheeler and unsupported by any law—which Wheeler
calls a "usability" test. Wheeler cites to no case law in support of such a test and for
good reason. This test is impractical and unworkable when applied to the present facts.
As explained by Wheeler, the gist of the proposed "usability" test is as" follows: "If
a new product is not useable by the customer in its anticipated fashion before it is
installed, and if in the course of being made useable by the seller as part of the sale it is
rendered" defective or unreasonably dangerous it should be covered by the Act."
(Wheeler App. Br. at 14.)
This test ignores the simple fact that, in cases such as this, the product seller is not
the only party capable of making an item "usable." Consequently, the untenable result of
such a test would be that if the seller of a nondefective product also happened to be the
one who installed the product, then a claim based on faulty installation must be treated as
a product liability claim. However, if the installation happened to be done by anyone
else, then a claim arising out of faulty installation would be treated as a negligence claim.
There is no basis in law for such an arbitrary distinction. It simply makes no sense that
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given identical products, identical installation requirements, and otherwise factually
indistinguishable scenarios, the treatment of a claim arising out of faulty installation
should depend entirely on whether the negligent installer also coincidentally happened to
be the seller of the product as well.
The insensibility of this test is made even plainer when applied to the facts of this
case. According to Wheeler's interpretation, because the contractor who caused the fire
was fortuitously hired by Wheeler rather than the City, the resulting claim must be treated
as an untimely product liability claim. If, however, the City had hired the contractor
itself, then the resulting claim would have sounded in negligence. Regardless of the fact
that the installation of the system could have been done by anyone—and was in reality
done by multiple parties—the simple fact that Wheeler coincidentally sold the product
that its contractor poorly installed should shield Wheeler from the City's negligence
claims, according to Wheeler's argument.
B. Essence of the Transaction.
The "essence of the transaction" test proposed by Wheeler also fails to resolve the
issue before the Court. This test is only helpful when attempting to determine whether a
product was sold or whether a service was provided. It does not satisfactorily address
cases like this where both things constituted the "essence of the transaction." Wheeler
both sold the parts for the generator system and by happenstance also provided the part of
the installation service that was allegedly negligent.
However, unlike the case of Brokenshire v. Rivas & Rivas, Ltd., 922 P.2d 696
(Ore. 1996), which was relied on by Wheeler, the installation work was not an
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inseparable element of the product itself. The seller in that case did not offer to sell
sealants as a product which the buyer could then install by applying it to an existing floor.
Rather, the product it offered was a sealed floor. In contrast, Wheeler could, and did, sell
component parts for which the City was at least in part responsible for assembling and
installing itself. The product it offered and delivered to the City was not a fully
assembled and installed generator system. It was the component parts for the generator
system—only a portion of which the City additionally hired Wheeler to install. The
installation work performed by Wheeler's contractor could have been performed by any
contractor, but in this case happened to have been performed by the contractor hired by
Wheeler. The mere fact that Wheeler filled two independent roles—product seller and
installation service provider—cannot in and of itself be the basis for converting the City's
negligent installation claim into a products liability claim.
In Alder, this Court set forth the best and most logical test for determining whether
installation is part of the product sale or not. Accordingly, this Court should uphold its
prior decision in Alder, and the analysis set forth therein, and reject Wheeler's offer to
adopt an entirely new, and unworkable, test.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reject Wheeler's arguments and
conclude that the negligent installation work performed by Wheeler's contract was not
part of the product itself. The products liability statute of limitations is therefore
inapplicable to the City's negligent installation claims against Wheeler.
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